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internal and external influences on state behavior. 
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The abundance of interstate negotiation and the notion that negotiation between states 
virtually always takes place within the framework of international organizations, or are 
otherwise governed and affected by informal institution makes my research a relevant topic in 
international relations. The following thesis will hopefully contribute to the existing 
knowledge of the field by offering new insights and explanation to the nature of interstate 
negotiations. 
Failed or suspended negotiations continuously prove t  be a common sight in international 
politics of our time. This paper will hopefully help understand why negotiations between 
states fail and how this can be explained by the negotiating states’ abuse of agenda setting. 
Furthermore, if the reasons and methods of agenda manipulation are discovered, perhaps the 
efficiency of negotiations can be improved as well. 
The central problem of the research is the abusive manipulation of the agenda setting process 
in international negotiation. As the topic of the rsearch is negotiation between states in 
international organizations, the behavior of key actors; states and institutions (both formal, 
like IOs and informal, such as traditions, customs and social norms) will be analyzed. 
Throughout this paper I understand the “abusive manipulation of the agenda setting process” 
to signify the phenomenon when some actor or actors involved in the agenda setting process 
try to influence the agenda setting in order to block the emergence of some (or any) outcome 
through means institutionalized within the framework f the negotiation itself. 
The framework of the negotiation can mean the rules of the international organization the 
negotiation takes place in, or any other rules and norms supplied by the relevant informal 
institutions. I will explore the significance of 1)problem delimitation, 2), different negotiation 
strategies 3) bias mobilization and 4) non-decision making techniques as tools to abusive 
agenda setting. 
These four factors are key concepts to understand how and why agenda setting can be 
exposed to exploitation. They offer insight into 1) power politics and state interest, 2) 
negotiation as a method to manage external relations, 3) the existing framework in which the 




The following hypotheses will be analyzed in this paper: 
1, States, as international actors possess different capabilities to influence global politics. This 
discrepancy in state’s power level is used to impleent agenda blocking and non-decision 
making techniques when crucial national interest is at take at international negotiations. 
2, States resort to agenda manipulation because they are not only concerned by their own self-
interests but also about the relative gain of other states. 
3, Reaching agreements on global issues is more likely if actors can pressure each other from 
employing non-decision making and agenda manipulation techniques. 
 
In the first chapter, I am going to establish the toretical framework, later to be used for the 
analysis of the case studies. Analytical case studies are conducted about the last three United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, taking place in 2009 Copenhagen, 2010 
Cancun and 2011 Durban. 
In the case studies I explore how agenda manipulation is pursued through problem 
delimitation and negotiation strategies and how these can be utilized to divert attention away 
from the real causes of a problem, that is, how non-decision making can make use of problem 
delimitation. 
In the theoretical framework chapter, problem delimitation and negotiation strategies will be 
designated as the first important components in successful agenda manipulation. The other 
elements will be presented afterwards as non-decision making and the Mobilization of Bias - 
following Schattschneider’s term. This expression is used to explain which ideas can make it 
to the decision making area, and how these ideas can be talked about. (Schattschneider, 1975) 
The following quote from Rochefort and Cobb links together the two components from 
Vesely and Schattschneider to shed light on the relation between non-decision making and 
problem definition: “Problem definition has to do with what we choose to identify as public 
issues and how we think about these concerns” (Rochef rt and Cobb, 1994) 
My research project is divided into a theoretical outline and an empirical case study part. Both 
of them are designed to enhance the mutual understanding of the relationship between the 
theory and practice of agenda manipulation. 
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In the theoretical introductory part I use a multidisciplinary approach to illuminate the 
interconnected relationship between various theories that can help explain the agenda 
manipulation at play in the selected case studies. In order to achieve this, I draw upon four 
key concepts tools from different disciplines and fields of study: problem delimitation, bias 
mobilization, non-decision making and negotiation analysis. 
Analyzing problem delimitation helps to understand how manipulating definitions and 
problem areas is utilized in the agenda setting process. Various theories of power (Bachrach 
and Baratz, Schattschneider) are used to explain how problem delimitation can be 
successfully achieved. 
The power theories link in the next conceptual tool: bias mobilization. This tool is based upon 
Schattschneider’s theory of mobilization of bias. With the help of this concept, I try to show 
the influence socially constructed identities and istitutions have on creating and sustaining an 
environment which facilitates abusive agenda manipulation. 
The fourth conceptual tool is non-decision making. Non-decision making thrives in the 
environment created through bias mobilization and is an important factor for extensive agenda 
manipulation. By analyzing how decision making can be avoided indefinitely through 
different techniques of non-decision making, I want to prepare the ground for the later 
presented case studies. 
Finally, negotiation theory links together the previous tools and offers some i portant 
insights into how agenda manipulation can work in international negotiations. In this part, I 
present a number of concepts of negotiation. I alsooffer theoretical explanation to why states 
engage in negotiation and what professional negotiators perceive as priorities in interstate 
negotiations. 
 
The following methodological approach will be used in examining the above hypothesis. I 
start with a discourse analysis of the relevant literature about agenda manipulation, decision 
theory, rational choice theory, non-decision making and the concept of “power” in 
international relations 
Data is collected and analyzed from library books, e-library sources, scholarly articles and 
international relations and political science journals. As case studies constitute an important 
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part of the thesis, empirical data collection and aalysis also constitutes an important part of 
the research work. 
Finally, I would like to present the different dimensions of my research topic. The nature of 
the research topic of the thesis – how agenda setting can be manipulated in international 
negotiations? – is sociological. 
The scope of enquiry is the general cluster of all negotiations in international organizations; 
however the thesis focuses on specific case studies. I mploy an observational mode of 
enquiry, trying to understand the mechanisms of agenda manipulation in negotiations through 
qualitative research methods. 
My research is based on a poststructuralist understanding of the subjects of my study: all the 
factors interplaying in agenda manipulation (actors, institutions, and the negotiation 
environment) are essentially products of changing social meaning defined according to the 
interests of some dominant group. This means that my understanding of the research topic and 
my findings are also influenced by my ideological subjectivity and political stance. 
 
 
I Establishing a theoretical background 
 
Introduction 
Constructing a theoretical framework is the first objective of the thesis. It provides the context 
in which the second part, the case studies can be analyzed and understood. Here several 
approaches will be combined together to supplement the necessary theoretical knowledge to 
understand the mechanisms of agenda manipulation in international negotiations. 
Throughout this thesis, agenda manipulation is understood to be the method of influencing the 
agenda setting process in a way that is beneficial to the manipulating actor. The following 
definition of agenda setting is adopted: agenda setting is “the politics of selecting issues for 
active consideration” (Rochefort and Cobb 1994). 
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In this section, four approaches will be highlighted o show what roles they play in the agenda 
manipulation process. First in the line is problem delimitation which deals with how to define 
the general issue-topic in the agenda setting procedure. Proper problem delimitation is 
concerned with careful topic selection and those who ish to manipulate the agenda setting 
process can utilize it to focus attention on a specific agenda topic while diverting attention 
away from others. 
Second, I look into the role of the negotiation process. Negotiation strategies and carful 
management of the negotiation process plays a crucial role in selecting some specific aspects 
of the main issue over others. 
Third, I draw upon Schattschneider’s Mobilization of Bias theory in order to show the 
importance socio-political biases have on issue selection and agenda manipulation. 
Considering the power of a priori (to the negotiations) socio-political biases and the resulting 
path dependency helps to understand why manipulating the agenda can be easier for some 
states than for others. 
Finally, the extent to which non-decision making techniques can influence the outcome of 
agenda manipulation is evaluated. Non-decision making can be particularly helpful for 
avoiding some agenda outcomes, or halting the negotiation and thus the agenda setting 
process. The introduction given in this chapter will prove to be helpful during the case studies 





Problem delimitation is regarded as an extremely significant process in policy analysis and is 
often viewed as indispensible for the success of policy implementation. It can be seen as a 
“multidisciplinary field of study that tries to analyze and understand causes of public policy 
problems” and includes several different steps: defining, structuring and modeling the 
problem. (Vesely, 2007) 
Throughout this paper problem delimitation is considered the first step of agenda 
manipulation for it is concerned with defining and structuring one particular problem over 
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another one. In international negotiations, defining what to talk about or perhaps more 
importantly what not to talk about has great impact on how the consecutive negotiations flow, 
and what possible outcomes they can reach. This means that problem delimitation can be 
severely exploited during the agenda setting process. 
Throughout the following chapters, I am going to explore how problem delimitation can be 
utilized to divert attention away from the real causes of a problem, that is, how non-decision 
making can make use of problem delimitation. After an introduction is given to non-decision 
making, I will look into how non-decision making can be successfully pursued for an 
indefinite time period. 
 
The abuse of problem delimitation 
 
Providing an accurate definition of a problem is the cornerstone of solving it. As such, one of 
the main purposes of problem delimitation is to make sure that the right questions are asked 
about a certain problem or issue. In theory this ensures that proper answer can be given to the 
emerging problem. However as we are all too often rminded:  “In theory, there is no 
difference between theory and practice, but in practice there is a great deal of 
difference.”(Ariely, 2009) 
In his book Predictably Irrational, Dan Ariely addresses the problem of rational choie 
between given alternatives. He argues that because of our irrational behavior, we often tend to 
focus on multiple issues at once, therefore failing to concentrate on a single immediate 
problem.(Ariely, 2009) Since policy making is done by human beings, irrationality is an 
inherent problem, and at the end of the day this can le d to inefficient policies enacted.  
Another significant effect of sufficient problem definition is that that the delimitation of a 
policy issue can also reveal the interconnected nature of the given problem. This can help 
deciding what is strictly connected to, or immediately affected by it, and what isn’t. It can also 
make clear the possible consequences of a certain pol cy, and can limit the amount of 
unforeseen side effects that may occur from pursuing a certain policy. 
By purposefully ignoring or abusing the two above mentioned features of problem 
delimitation, policy makers can hide the interconnectedness and the consequences of policies, 
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or commit an error of the third type, that it, asking the “wrong” questions that don’t invoke 
the proper answer required to solve the original problem at hand. (Vesely, 2007) 
Aside from asking the wrong questions outright, other possible problems regarding policy 
delimitation can also arise. 
Seeking to manipulate the agenda making process, policy makers can also employ some sort 
of insufficient problem delimitation. Defining a policy problem clearly affects the agenda 
setting process by lying down the basic concepts. The way Birkland argues for this is that “the 
depiction of the cause of a problem strongly suggests a solution to the problem”. (Birkland, 
2007) 
According to E. E. Schattschneider, those who can successfully influence how a problem is 
pictured can also make it seem like they have the right answer for it (Schattschneider 1975). 
Therefore policy problem delimitation is a major instrument in manipulating the agenda 
setting process. Being able to influence what is on the agenda, can potentially mean being 
able to influence what problem solving approaches get discriminated. 
Besides readily offering a given set of solutions, proper problem delimitation also helps with 
deciding on which levels policy makers should deal with the issues at hand. (Birkland, 2007) 
This increases the likelihood of successfully implementing a policy. 
Agenda manipulation can take advantage of poor horizontal problem positioning. In practice 
if a policy maker judges it to be beneficial to practice non-decision making techniques in the 
agenda setting process, proposing the wrong level to address a question can result in 
ineffective policies regardless whether the original question put forward was wrong or right. 
 
Negotiation tactics as methods for aspect filtering 
 
Negotiation is the second step in the agenda manipulat on process in international 
negotiations. While problem delimitation is concerned with how to structure an issue and 
what questions to ask about it, the negotiation process deals with fine tuning the specific 
problems in an issue area through strategic interaction of participating states. 
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In a broad sense, international negotiation can be defined as “as a process by which states and 
other actors in the international arena exchange proposals in an attempt to agree about a point 
of conflict and manage their future relationship”. (Jackson 2000) 
Negotiation can take place for several reasons and c  encompass many forms of formal and 
informal behavior. Jackson argues to perceive negotiation as a continuous flow, instead of a 
static action: “[negotiation] should not be seen as a single process or one discrete activity. It is 
instead a continuous set of related activities involving actors, decisions and situations.” 
(Jackson 2000) 
States decide to negotiate to solve problems, demonstrate values, distribute resources and 
administer relationships. Whatever strategy is chosen for negotiations, it depends on what 
agreements the parties wish to reach. More than one reason can of course be present at the 
same time. (Winham 1979) 
Writing about the experiences of international negotiati n experts, Winham highlights various 
aspects of negotiation. First of all, it can be helpful if we understand negotiation not only as 
strategic interaction, but also as a form of management. „Negotiation is a tool in the 
management of external relations. The decision to negotiate should take account of the facts 
of the situation, objectives (what should be done), and policy alternatives (what can be done)” 
(Winham 1979) 
In much of the established theory on negotiation, there exists a distinction between 
cooperative (inclusive) and competitive (distributive) negotiation tactics. (Odell, 2009) Either 
of these approaches individually, or even a combinatio  of the two can be successful tools in 
agenda manipulation. Regarding them as management tools, instead of simply part of a grand 
negotiation strategy, provides flexibility indispensible for successful negotiations. (Winham, 
1979) 
According to Winham, the negotiation procedure can be divided into two parts: external and 
internal negotiation: “Negotiations are two-fronted, and participants should distinguish 
between external considerations related to the foreign government(s) and internal 
considerations related to the home government (and negotiating team)”. (Winham, 1979) 
Throughout the case studies, external negotiation, negotiation between different states will be 
examined more carefully. However, it must also be noted, that internal negotiations influence 
the outcome of external negotiation a great deal. 
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When defining the problems and goals of the negotiati ns (an integral part of agenda 
manipulation) internal negotiation takes place betwe n the negotiating team and the home 
government and interest groups. Winham suggests tha the role of interest groups is often 
underrated: “One such variable that affects mainly the internal side of negotiation concerns 
the activities of special interest groups. These activities are generally given inadequate 
attention in the literature, in comparison to the importance apparently given to them by 
practitioners. For example, […] practitioners [are] concerned with special interest groups in 
all three phases of the negotiation process; specific references are made to identifying relevant 
interest groups, maintaining the support of such groups, and reconciling those groups that are 
opposed to the negotiator's policies”. (Winham, 1979). Internal negotiation helps defining a 
bottom line for the negotiating team. 
External negotiation takes place between the different negotiating teams. From the 
perspective of agenda manipulation, this is where the participating states’ specific issue 
preferences clash, aspects of the issue area sorted u  and some aspects are selected over 
others. Winham proposes five considerations to keep in mind when analyzing external 
negotiation: 
1) What does the home government want the negotiation to achieve? 
2) What do the other governments want to achieve through the negotiations? Are the 
stated and actual positions in accordance with eachother? 
3) Is there possibility for a common ground? 
4) What are the bargaining strategies that are being employed? Are they the appropriate 
tool for the particular job? 
5) Is the position of important allies well coordinated? (Winham, 1979) 
Throughout the case studies, these points are considered in order to analyze the different 
states’ negotiation strategies. 
Besides the internal-external aspects of negotiation, ther dimensions should also be 
considered to provide a proper understanding of the role the negotiation procedure plays in 
agenda manipulation. The three time dimensions of negotiation Jacobs proposes are useful to 
show the interrelated aspects of the various theoretical approaches presented in this chapter. 
Jackson defines three time dimensions in which negotiations can take place. “(1) antecedent 
or past; (2) concurrent or present; and (3) consequent or future”. (Jackson, 2000) 
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Jackson defines the first dimension as follows: “The antecedent dimension refers to all those 
inputs and variables which exist prior to engaging in negotiation”. In the analytical framework 
of this thesis, the antecedent dimension encompasses what was referred to in the introduction 
as the Mobilization of Bias. Our existing cognitive socio-political framework sets a priori 
conditions for the negotiation. 
In the same place he defines the second, present dimens on, as “[describing] a range of factors 
which characterize the conditions and process of a particular negotiation situation”. In this 
thesis’ theoretical context, problem delimitation is used to understand how these “range of 
factors” are selected. 
Furthermore, the theoretical framework of this model presents non-decision making as an 
approach that shapes the outcome of agenda manipulation. The third, future dimension which 
Jackson defines as the aspect which “draws attention to the outcome of the bargain” is also 
concerned with how negotiations are shaped in the end. 
While drawing upon Jackson’s time dimensions, I tried to show how the various aspects of 
the outlaid theoretical framework interrelate with each other. The negotiation procedure is the 
active driving force in agenda manipulation. States participating in international negotiations 
wish to propose their own agendas and propose the division of problem areas in ways that 
invoke solutions most preferable to them. 
Active negotiation is the vessel through which states make these proposals, but other aspects 
such as a priori biases, careful problem delimitation and techniques of non-decision making 
can all influence the negotiation process and thus e agenda setting process and ultimately 











Schattschneider’s Mobilization of Bias 
 
In the following section the environment in which agenda manipulation is practiced or 
sustained are further investigated. However, in order to complement the previous parts where 
the role of the active (or inactive) decision maker was analyzed, this time the larger 
framework in which non-decision making is exercised will be examined. Following 
Schattschneider I label this framework the Mobilization of Bias. 
The mobilization of bias can be defined as the group f prevailing norms and values of 
society that ensures and legitimizes hegemonic culture while also helps political socialization. 
(Schattschneider, 1975) The mobilization of bias is present at every level of society and 
evolves in every social institution. (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970) 
Naturally speaking, it is possible that different se s of values and norms can be present at the 
same time in different societies, or even at different levels of the same society. Nonetheless, 
these norms and values form the framework that governs very action on the respective levels 
or societies. 
The Mobilization of Bias becomes important for the analysis of non-decision making as it 
fundamentally influences what issues can potentially rise to the decision making area, and 
those who are interested in shaping the agenda setting process are especially interested in how 
to control this procedure. 
The political language, customs, methods and institutions all affect which questions arise, 
what can be talked about and what can be and needs to be negotiated. Therefore setting the 
rules and influencing what gets on the agenda are extr mely important in promoting one’s 
interest. 
The Mobilization of Bias governs exactly this: the norms, values and customs that constitute 
the Mobilization of Bias control what are all the possible issues to discuss in a given society 
or level of the society. 
Birkland proposes a similar idea that he labels “several levels of the agenda”. (Birkland, 
2007) He distinguishes different layers in which any idea can possibly appear. The layer in his 
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concept, that fulfills a similar role to Schattschneider’s Mobilization of Bias is labeled as the 
“systemic agenda, in which is contained any idea tht could possibly be considered by 
participants in the policy process”. (Birkland, 2007) 
 
Figure 1. Birkland’s “Levels of the Agenda”. Source: Birkland, Thomas A.: Agenda Setting 
in Public Policy. Handbook for Public Policy Analysis: Theory, Politics, and Methods (2007) 
page 64. 
 
However, the Mobilization of Bias also affects how issues can be discussed, that is, it affects 
the political language that is used to set the rules and the institutions that govern problem 
formulation. (Schattschneider, 1975) Schattschneider’s often quoted idea: “the definition of 
alternatives is the supreme instrument of power” sums this up neatly. 
This also means that the Mobilization of Bias works in favor of the prevailing regime since 
those who successfully influence the available alternatives – usually this would mean the 
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current decision makers – can also easily manipulate who can enter the field where the 
alternatives are set. (Schattschneider, 1975) 
In practice, it also has the consequence that those who were early one successful in setting the 
alternatives and handling conflicts in their own favor will have an easier time sustaining the 
system, than those who want to enter the system frothe outside to change it. (Mair, 1997) 
This allows for the long time existence a certain set of rules, that is, a long term Mobilization 
of Bias. 
While this framework forms our social conscious to a significant degree by preserving the 
prevailing norms, it is also important to realize that the Mobilization of Bias itself needs to be 
sustained. 
Even though there is a quite powerful self sustaining effect it enjoys - through the ability to 
filter out the emerging issues that might challenge the framework - it must also be pointed out 
that there are other actors who can potentially affect the maintenance of the current values, 
norms and customs. 
Media and mass-communication in particular turn out t  be major contributors to an existing 
Mobilization of Bias. However, every other form of contemporary popular culture also play 
important role in supporting the Mobilization of Bias. 
Media offers a mean of communication or a platform of discourse where different ideas and 
cultural products can be expressed and easily transmitted to masses of people at the same 
time. This gives media as well as popular culture an extremely important role in the agenda 
setting process. 
Werner and Kai highlight this when they say: “despite the existence of different patterns of 
agenda-setting, modern societies are characterized by a distinctive role of the public/media for 
agenda-setting and policy-making”. (Jann and Wegrich, 2007) Moreover, in the times of mass 
media, the communication of values and norms (the pillars of a Mobilization of Bias) 
becomes really easy. 
Perhaps nowadays it may seem there are more and more ideas emerging and are available in 
popular media, but on the other hand, these tend to be ideas that are in accordance with the 
ruling Mobilization of Bias. For example, even though liberal democracies highly value 
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freedom of speech, certain ideas that are perceived to be politically incorrect or have negative 
historical connotations are immediately superseded to the peripheries. 
In contemporary western World relatively few try to openly promote or campaign for Nazism 
or Stalinism; what is considered politically correct varies from one system of Mobilization of 
Bias to another, but it can nevertheless be said tht media generally supports the framework it 
exists in. 
This support comes in the form of controlling the information asymmetry between different 
parts of society, and also the access to information in general. Media as well as other forms of 
popular culture can both increase or decrease information asymmetry and recognizing this is 
essential for this study of public non-decision making. 
As Werner and Kai point out in their study Theories of the Policy Cycle, identify agenda 
setting and the mechanics of problem recognition are “tightly connected with the way a social 
problem is recognized and perceived on the public/media agenda.” Media content can thus 
help or hinder the social recognition of a given problem. (Jann and Wegrich, 2007) 
The way media or popular culture affect the social recognition of certain issues is through the 
cycling of ideas. In practice it means that ideas present in society are picked up by media to be 
simplified and fed back to society in the form of ppular mass culture. This is a binding force 
of contemporary western societies as this process reinfo ces the social conscious and norms, 
therefore it helps our socialization. 
However it also means that “revolutionary” ideas are usually immediately excluded from this 
cycle which sustains the existing Mobilization of Bias and therefore the current distribution of 
power, benefits and disadvantages. 
From the example of media as a building stone of Mobilization of Bias it can be seen that the 
purpose of this framework is to sustain an environme t where certain ideas and groups are 
immediately excluded from the agenda and decision making process. This is essential for non-
decision making as it ensures that certain kinds of answers are prevented from emerging and 
thus eventually becoming implemented. 
On the other hand the Mobilization of Bias also provides a natural selection of which issues 
are to be perceived as problems and thus also generat s a selection between what kind of 






Defining non-decision making 
 
In order to successfully explain the mechanisms of non-decision making for further usage in 
my thesis, I will first define what non-decision making is about. First and foremost, in this 
paper non-decision making will be perceived as a continuous attitude of decision makers as 
opposed to merely being a single act. 
It is also defined as a sustained course of action, instead of a simple, unrelated collection of 
actions of merely not deciding. Even more, throughout the paper it will be avoided to refer to 
non-decision making as an action of consciously not deciding on the part of the non-decision 
maker. Instead, I will emphasize that one of the important characteristic of non-decision 
making is that the non-decision maker’s prime objectiv  is to avoid taking unwanted action 
and to elude acting in certain undesirable situations. 
From this we should see that an important feature of non-decision making is the notion that a 
certain actor not actually making a certain decision is not the point of interest. Decision 
making mechanisms are not even necessarily required in cases when we wish to investigate 
the non-decision making processes because the essenc  of non-decision making is how to 
prevent a particular issue from getting to the decision making arena, or how to avoid having to 
solve a certain problem. (Frey, 1971) 
Mann however reminds us that the lack of decision making process notwithstanding, non-
decision making in practice produces actual decisions and it can have very real consequences 
even though no one actually makes these decisions. (Mann, 1976) 
Non-decision making helps us answer two questions, both of which are ultimately concerned 
with the distribution of power among actors involved in any given decision making situation. 
First, how the wielders of power try to exercise influence over the emergence of issues, and 
second, what consequences can unconscious decisions have, or in other words, how decisions 
come about under circumstances where the decision maker is not aware of the decision being 
made, either because of willful ignorance or a genuine information deficit. 
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The theory of non-decision making originates from Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz. 
(Mann, 1976) In their influential book, Power and Poverty, they investigate the theory of 
public decision making and issues of power relations. 
To enhance the understanding of non-decision making, it must be defined what will be 
understood as decision throughout this paper. They define decision as a “set of actions related 
to and including the choice of one alternative rather than another”. (Bachrach and Baratz, 
1963) Or, to put it another way: “a choice among alternative modes of action”. (Bachrach and 
Baratz, 1963) 
In harmony with the above outlined definitions of decision, Dale Mann defines non-decision 
making as “a policy made without participation where participation may have been expected 
to occur”. (Mann, 1976) The most important concept in his definition is that non-decision 
making is perceived as a form of decision making technique in which participation is 
dissatisfactory. 
As I will demonstrate later, it is a technique that points towards preserving the existing status 
quo. It aims at preventing the emergence of situations that would require a decision to be 
made. Therefore non-decision making is inherently concerned with the agenda setting process 
and wishes to influence it in the favor of the non-decision maker. 
On the other had it is also a technique that helps to avoid giving answers to the problems 
already at hand. All in all, a method to prevent change directed against the interests of those 
who are in power. 
 
How non-decision making is achieved and sustained 
 
This part is investigating the methods through which non-decision making can be 
implemented and pursued successfully as an ongoing ge eral policy. The lessons from the 
previous chapters, problem delimitation and bias mobilization will be combined and evaluated 
to show non-decision making can be an effective tool in agenda manipulation. 
Understanding the mechanisms behind these processes is crucial to be able to successfully 
localize the issue areas where non-decision making is taking place. Moreover, understanding 
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how they work also helps revealing the underlying iterests and values. In turn, uncovering 
these motivations can also offer help in countering policies of non-decision making. 
 
How non-decision making can become problematic and why decision makers 
would employ it? 
 
The general idea and the underlying mechanisms wereboth studied in the previous sections, 
so now it must also be inspected why non-decision making can pose a problem in public 
policy and if it indeed is harmful, what would be the reason for decision makers still opt to 
use such techniques. 
First of all it must be defined what problematic is. This study is not going to make 
assumptions about human nature as such but instead it accepts that as decisions are made by 
humans, these decisions are affected by the individual attributes and preferences of the human 
beings making them. 
There are also no assumptions about the selfish or envious behavior decision making actors, 
while on the other hand the notion that actors might behave self-centered or might behave 
community-centered is accepted. Therefore we need to differentiate between what is 
problematic for the community and what is problematic for the individual actor. 
It may very well happen that a decision making actor pursuing his or her own interests 
through non-decision making can damage the interests of the community, but it is 
nevertheless not taken as a starting ground for this paper. On the other hand, since the main 
purpose of this part is to explore the impact of non-decision making in the agenda setting 
process, the concerns of the public enjoy primary preference.  
As outlined in the above parts, non-decision making techniques offer several ways to 
influence what questions arise, what answers are given to them and also how to avoid taking 
action. 
There can be obvious negative consequences of avoiding making necessary but unpopular 
decisions, not implementing the necessary policy out of fear of public dislike, or simply 
offering an easier but inadequate answer. As the cas studies in the second part of this paper 
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will demonstrate non-decision making can also be usd to purposefully promote wrong 
questions to be answered with a seemingly right answer. 
They will also serve as an example to show that non-decision making can have problematic 
consequences in public policy, as it gives decision making actors the tools to focus public 
attention away from issues that are important for the community on the medium or long run 
and instead focusing on short term goals. 
Despite the possible negative consequences for the public good, non-decision making is still 
often encountered in the public sector. As non-decision making is a primary tool for 
preserving the prevailing power relations, it can be tempting for the beneficiaries of power to 
employ these techniques for their own personal gains even though it might damage the public 
interest. 
Besides personal reasons such as carrier gains, outside influences can also push a decision 
maker to pursue non-decision making practices. As the case studies will also make obvious, 
lobby pressure from outside the immediate decision making area often plays a significant role 
in the agenda setting process through their bargaining power. Therefore they also affect the 
policies implemented by pursuing decision makers to give a certain answer to the emerging 
problems that favors the lobby group over other parts of the society. 
 
The effects of non-decisions 
 
How non-decision making can become a problem was discussed in the previous chapter, but 
the actual impacts of non-decision making can have, should also be considered. 
The main problem with public non-decisions is that it aims at preserving the current status 
quo of the governing elite. By avoiding changing the agenda, the central issues of the current 
power holders are continuously preserved. This also conserves not only the possible, but also 
the actual answers that are given to these issues. Th refore the current distribution of power 
will remain unchanged as new challenges are being ig ored. 
This leaves little room for improvement in the quality of solutions for emerging problems. 
The suppression of new ideas can lead to a state of lack of innovation, where change can only 
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happen when problems that are not addressed on the agenda of the ruling elite get so sever 
outside the system that it affects the mere existence of the system itself. 
No possibility for innovation also influences the effectiveness of the possible answers the 
governing elite can implement. As the case study will exemplify non-decision making in 
public policy leads to enacting ineffective policies that often fail to fulfill what public sector 





II The case studies 
 
Introduction 
The following chapter on the three case studies of the Copenhagen (2009), Cancún (2010) and 
Durban (2011) aims to show how the previously outlined theoretical approach works in real 
life negotiations. Climate change is certainly a topic that affects every country, albeit perhaps 
through different means and to different degrees. Nevertheless, as the case studies show, all 
participating countries in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change had 
some sort of interest in the negotiations’ outcome. 
Although it would certainly be interesting to analyze every climate summit following the 
Kyoto protocol, due to limited space available and i  order to remain relevant to 
contemporary international politics, only the last three are analyzed. 
A comparative case study analysis allows the research r to conduct in-depth analysis of 
separate, yet related cases, revealing changing strategies, interests and negotiation techniques 
used by the participants. This allows us to see ultimate focus of the research, the working of 
agenda manipulation, in a different perspective. 
When analyzing the climate change talks in Copenhagen, Cancun and Durban, the following 
four groups of state actors were identified: United States, European Union, the BRICS 
countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and the AOSIS countries (Alliance 
of Small Island States). 
Three criteria were chosen in selecting the actors: 1) their economic power, 2) the level of 
danger climate change poses to the state and 3) the gen ral awareness of climate change 
within the countries. The last criteria can also be understood as the level of political culture of 
a given state as this approach has interesting implications for domestic public pressure on the 
government to take action on climate change. (A more in-depth discussion on the effects of 
public opinion pressure can be found in the “alternative approaches” section of this thesis.) 
The focus in the case studies will be on the agenda manipulation actions of those countries 
who are the largest emitters owing to their economic power (also referred to as the dirty 
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dozen1), who are the most affected by the adverse effects of climate change either due to the 
geographic conditions or for a lack of awareness of climate change. 
The first case study is the 2009 Copenhagen climate conference that was preceded by great 
anticipation and enthusiasm. The climate summit wasexpected to deliver a new treaty to 
replace the Kyoto protocol after its expiration in 2012. However, due to the strictly opposing 
interests of the main polluter United States and China, the climate talks failed to live up to the 
expectations and seriously shattering the credibility of the multilateral United Nations climate 
change framework. 
As a consequence, the following conference in Cancún in 2010 started off with modest goals, 
mainly aiming at restoring the credibility of the UNFCCC. Even though this goal was 
achieved in the end, new dividing lines emerged betwe n the participating countries. 
The 2011 Durban climate summit was conducted under extreme pressure, as the expiration of 
the Kyoto protocol became more and more of a reality. Despite the initial negotiation 
deadlocks between the largest emitters, a roadmap for a legally binding new treaty was 
pushed through and thus the conference ultimately was regarded as a success. 
The case studies will extensively build upon relevant contemporary press releases and media 




Case study on the Copenhagen Climate Summit 2009 
 
Overview of the Copenhagen Climate Conference 
 
The United Nations Copenhagen Climate Conference took place December 7-18 in 
Copenhagen with the goal to create a successive climate change control regime for the period 
after the Kyoto Protocol which expires in 2012. 
                                                




The outcome of the Summit was widely considered to be a failed opportunity in Western 
media. The Guardian signaled the dissatisfaction saying: “The UN climate summit reached a 
weak outline of a global agreement in Copenhagen tonight, falling far short of what Britain 
and many poor countries were seeking and leaving months of tough negotiations to come.” 
(Vidal et al. 2009)  
The Copenhagen Accord that was drafted on the last d y of the summit is a non-binding 
agreement which came to be regarded as a weak political declaration. The signing members 
declare that they “recognize the scientific view that the increase in global temperature should 
be below 2 degree Celsius”, and that they “recognize the critical impacts of climate change” 
while they also agree that “a comprehensive adaptation programme including international 
support” is needed to be set up in order to help the adversely affected countries. (The 
Copenhagen Accord, 2009) 
The Accord also doesn’t propose any legally binding obligations, however it does contain a 
chart into which participating countries can list their “quantified economy-wide emission 
targets for 2020”. (The Copenhagen Accord, 2009) 
Even though climate change is a global issue, many of the participating countries – mainly the 
most significant CO2 emitter developing nations like China, India, Brazil and South Africa 
and also the United State – were reluctant to think in global terms and tried to promote their 
own national interests. 
On the other hand, those third world developing natio s, who are also among the most 
threatened and vulnerable countries simply lacked to bargaining power to be able to 
successfully promote their national interests despit  those being based on putting a stop to 
global warming. They were also faced with the problem of which major player to support. 
It was clear that any aid for coping with climate change would come from the West for these 
countries. (Ramesh, 2009) Meanwhile China, India and the other major emitters of the third 
world tried to gain the support of these countries by emphasizing the difference between 
“survival emission” of the developing world and “lifestyle emission” of the developed world, 
thus pointing at the responsibility of the West. (Ramesh, 2009) 
The European Union found itself in a somewhat ambiguous situation regarding what interests 
to pursue given that despite it shows continuous commitment towards fighting climate change 
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as a whole, some of the member countries didn’t agree with the methods, or had voiced 
skepticism. 
The EU members in 2007 “endorsed an integrated appro ch to climate and energy poliacy and 
committed to transforming Europe into a highly energy-efficient, low carbon economy”, 
while a “unilateral commitment that Europe would cut its emissions by at least 20% of 1990 
levels by 2020.” was also made.(European Commission, 2009) 
Despite the policy plans however, the EU faced some internal discord over climate change 
issues. Vaclav Klaus, president of the Czech Republic, voiced his disbelief over the true threat 
climate change poses when he said "manmade climate ch nge has become one of the most 
dangerous arguments aimed at distorting human efforts and public policies in the whole 
world". (Randerson, 2009) Czech Republic fulfilled the Presidency of the Council of the 
European Union in the term previous to the Copenhagen conference. 
In addition other member states signaled concern over the European carbon trading system, 
also known as ETS. Poland depending mainly on coal as fuel for its industry threatened to 
veto the ETS as it could make them dependent on Russian energy supplies. (Worthington, 
2009) 
Despite there are some conflicting interests between th  member states the European Union 
has long been “showing the way forward through its strategy to fight climate change and the 
policies that it already implements or has proposed to the member states and the European 
Parliament”. (European Commission, 2009) Combating climate change, adopting more 
responsible ways to use its natural resources while promoting renewable energy sources are 
the main interests of the EU as they encourage innovation and enhance economic growth. 





Comparative analysis of state negotiation strategies 
 
This chapter is aimed to demonstrate that the domestic is ues and policies of the participating 
countries were transferred to the international aren  and to present that far-reaching attempts 
at agenda manipulation were employed in abundance in order to achieve domestic goals. 
A look at the applied non-decision making methods will show that different domestic interests 
clash between states. This meant that cooperation was only possible for countries that shared 
common domestic policies towards climate change. If they wanted to successfully cooperate, 
the issues states recognized as problems were to be delin ated similarly and their answers also 
had to be identified in the same way for these issue . 
In order to analyze the non-decision making techniques, a three step approach will be applied. 
First the groups of actors with similar interests and domestic policies are identified. Second 
the answers that were given for the problems arising from the clash of domestic policies and 
how these answers relied on the successful application of non-decision making techniques for 
each group is presented. 
The particular advantages and disadvantages for the different problem delimitations are then 
shown along with which actors were successful in appro riately defining the problems.  
The chapter aims at arguing that successful problem d limitation is one that points towards 
solving the problem meaning that different problem delimitations of different actors could all 
be successful even though the climate conference as a whole was not perceived as an overall 
success as it did not end with taking global action. The difference between the overall success 
versus the favorable outcome of the conference for ach individual player will be emphasized. 
  
 
The international clash of inter
immediately mean a clear way for
pursuing its goals while, the EU and the US (Obama in particular)
countries proved to be the losers of this clash.




Figure 2. Country relations and interests towards each other and the Climate Deal at the 2009 
Copenhagen Climate Conference
 
The first set of participating countries that had similarly identified interests and domestic 
policies are Brazil, China, India and South Africa (BASIC). They all share similar domestic 
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policies regarding the energy sector: massive investm nts in renewable energy sources, 
incentives for more efficient energy usage and strong domestic regulations. (Renewable 
Energy & Energy Efficiency Partnership, 2010) Both in India and Brazil renewable energy 
sources contribute to around 9% of their total energy generation, while in China and South 
Africa this contribution is below 5%. (Ibid.)  
At the same time, they still mostly rely on fossil energy sources in order to fuel their soaring 
industries and to be competitive on the internationl market. They together account for 
approximately one third of Earth’s total CO2 emission. (United Nations Millennium 
Development Goals Indicators) 
Therefore their main agenda was how to avoid the imple entation of a legally binding global 
emission control regime that potentially could penalize them. This also meant that the basic 
goal of these actors was contradictory to the aim of the Climate Summit. 
China also pursued another important goal that the o r members of the BASIC countries did 
not share. As a main competitor for leadership in adesired multilateral world, China wanted 
to ensure that the United States and the European Union are seen as incapable of successfully 
handling the challenges of global climate change that ey cause in the first place with their 
“lifestyle emission”. 
The BASIC countries realized that they share similar interests with the United States in that 
they both wanted to avoid the construction of a legally binding CO2 emission reduction 
framework. However they also realized that they can’t cooperate openly with the USA, 
therefore they looked for various techniques that first hindered the progress of the climate 
talks and then made sure that it will be the develop d countries who will be blamed for the 
failure of the conference. 
In order to achieve this, they emphasized the difference between the West’s “lifestyle 
emission” and the developing nation’s “survival emission”. Displacing attention is a classic 
non-decision making technique in which “two parties are engaged in acts unacceptable to 
each other, [and] if media attention can be focused on the acts of one, then those of the other 
can be treated as of little consequence” (Judge, 1997) 
With criticizing the West for its „lifestyle emission” the BASIC countries also managed to 
promote an extremely simplified view of the causes of global warming and also to create a 
scapegoat of the developed countries. Over simplificat on and scapegoating are other methods 
29 
 
of non-decision making. The former one is used to force through “an agenda in which it is 
convenient to exclude categories and especially the relationships between them”, while in the 
latter one, the non-decision maker tries to attribue “inability to act effectively to the actions 
of some other group”, in this case the western countries. (Judge, 1997) 
The careful usage of these techniques made it possible for the BASIC countries to shift the 
blame to the developed countries and to not reach a binding agreement on CO2 emission cuts. 
The kind of problem formulation the BASIC countries followed proved to be successful. They 
acknowledge the problem global warming poses but enviro ment consciousness and 
economic growth was differentiated with the latter taking priority. They successfully 
identified that the main problem for them would be to fall victim to a legally binding 
international regime that can hinder their economic development. 
This approach eventually contributed to the failure th  Copenhagen Summit ended with. 
However it does not mean that the problem delimitation itself was not adequate, as it still 
pointed towards the solution of the issue these countries identified as the primary problem: 
how to sustain their economic competitiveness and growth in the face of continuous pressure 
from the Western countries. 
 
The second set of actors is the AOSIS (Alliance of Small Island States). These states are of 
the most vulnerable ones to the adverse effects of climate change, therefore their main issue 
was to reach an agreement with the major polluters about capping CO2 emissions in a 
reasonable time frame. 
They argued that global warming must be stopped, an in order to do that, the emission of 
greenhouse effect gasses needs to peek in the following decade. However they had the least 
bargaining power and were dependent on the other acto s. 
In this complex situation, they faced several question . Who to support, who can better help 
their survival, the developed world, or the BASIC countries? Should they sign the agreement 
so that they can benefit from the western founds even though this agreement does not ensure 
the possibility to stop global warming in any reasonable time? 
The main problem formulation of small island states was based on the threat global warming 
poses for their mere existence. It was obvious from the beginning that the outcome of the 
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conference depended on whether the United States and China can reach some sort of 
agreement about emission reduction. Therefore the problem small island states identified as 
such was which major player to support. 
Being severely disappointed with the lack of democrati  decision making and the abundance 
of distributive negotiation that took place during the Climate Summit, at the end of the 
conference, with a few exceptions, they mostly lined up behind the BASIC countries, blaming 
the United States for the failure. 
This kind of answers that these countries came up with did not turn out to be successful, as it 
did not point towards the solving of their main issue . These countries failed to achieve their 
basic goals of creating a legally binding framework that would control CO2 emissions and 
eventually stop global warming. 
A successful policy cold have been to help the United States and the European Union putting 
pressure on the BASIC countries while negotiating about the various climate aids with the 
developed countries. 
 
The third set of actors was the member states of the European Union. Their main issues were 
to put a stop to global warming by reaching an agreement that legally binds the participating 
countries to reduce their greenhouse gas emission. 
Achieving this would reinforce its leadership on climate change combat that it sought to take 
hold of. The main problem it faced was how to make the BASIC countries cooperate in order 
to construct a strong, legally binding deal and to av id being framed as a scapegoat by the 
former group. 
Despite all its effort, the European Union was not successful in reinforcing leadership or make 
BASIC countries cooperate because it did not succeed in transferring its policies into the 
international level. However, it made unilateral commitments of CO2 emission cuts that are 
advantageous for fighting climate change and also for the EU economy on the long run. 
The European Union’s problem delimitation of the issues it was facing was fairly successful 
because it did contribute to solving the problems the EU perceived as such at the conference. 
Even though it did not manage to reach cooperation with the BASIC countries, it unilaterally 
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proposed its own carbon dioxide reduction targets that can potentially set an example to 
follow. 
Employing such inclusive negotiation moves definitely pointed towards finding a solution to 
alleviating the problems of global warming. At the same time, as the conference itself was 
regarded as a failure, the European Union failed to seize the leader position it wished for in 
fighting climate change. 
The EU also did not manage to successfully shift the blame from itself to other players, even 
though this would have been essential in convincing the public audience that the European 
Union is a serious global actor despite the failure at Copenhagen. 
 
The fourth actor was the United States which as the second largest polluter faced a number of 
problems first, how to avoid the agreement on a binding deal while looking committed to 
fighting climate change. The other issues were how to reinforce its world leadership and how 
to make BASIC countries to comply with its CO2 emission reduction monitoring demands. 
To successfully pursue the above agenda, the United States also utilized non-decision making 
techniques. Its main goal was to hamper the construction of the climate deal by making its 
own participation dependent on demands that it thoug t would be unmet by the BASIC 
countries. 
This non-decision making strategy of “focusing on the inaccessible […] involves one of the 
parties in a decision-making arena indicating that t ey are prepared to go ahead 'only if 
everybody else agrees'. This gives the appearance of a p sitive approach. It is especially 
successful in avoiding decision-making if it is unlike y that others will agree in this way” 
(Judge, 1997). 
During the talks the United States made it clear that its own CO2 emission cuts were 
dependent on the set up of a “monitoring regime to nsure that countries do indeed cut their 
greenhouse gas emissions as promised. That is contenti us for countries such as India and 
China”. (The Guardian’s Copenhagen Diary, 2009) 
The US also tried to engage in the scapegoating game of the BASIC countries; however it was 
not able to shift the blame back on them. The United States argued that the BASIC countries 
are just as responsible for global warming as the developed countries. This argument over 
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who is to blame for climate change was a vital point in the non-decision making strategies of 
both the United States and the BASIC countries. Sustaining this ongoing argument ensured 
that everyone was more concerned about finding out who is to blame than about creating a 
solution that could put an end to global warming. 
Similar to the European Union, the United States also chieved mixed results with its problem 
delimitation. They were successful in promoting their own issues to address at the conference 
instead of the pressing problem of climate change that was supposed to be the real issue of the 
conference. 
This allowed the US to find ways to avoid reaching a legally binding agreement; however 
they were unable to appropriately react to Chinese non-decision making techniques that 
almost exclusively focused on the responsibilities of the United States and the European 
Union for global warming. The image of President Barack Obama suffered especially heavily 
from the continuous blame for not being ready to take sufficient actions.  
 




In 2010, the sixteenth session of the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change) took place in Cancún, Mexico from 
November 29th to December 10th. Many considered the COP 16 to be crucial for the sole 
reason that this time the whole credibility of UNFCC  was at stake here. 
In the following case study I analyze the behavior of key state actors during the sixteenth 
Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC focusing on their main agendas and how they tried 
to manipulate the agenda setting process. The key actors are chosen based on relative 
industrial power and thus the level of pollution caused, vulnerability and susceptibility to the 
adverse effects of climate change while also considering how much they can influence the 
outcome of the negotiations. Based on these principles, the main actors to be considered are 
the United States, the BASIC nations, the AOSIS natio s and the European Union.  
33 
 
After the failure of COP 15 in Copenhagen, participating members to the Framework 
Convention began to voice their doubts over whether  United Nations framework was 
indeed the right place to negotiate a new climate deal to replace the Kyoto protocol. Jairam 
Ramesh, Indian environment minister highlighted the cr dibility issue: "Cancun is the last 
chance. The credibility of the entire climate change egotiating system is at stake. If you do 
not get a set of operational and meaningful decisions at Cancun, everybody is going to get 
sick and tired of us." 
The Copenhagen conference showed that the credibility cr sis was fueled by contrasting 
interests in a number of issues. It was not clear whether the Kyoto protocol should be 
lengthened or a completely new deal should be struck. Whether a possible new treaty (if any) 
should have legal binding power was yet another problem that states seemed unable to agree 
upon. Consequently the future of Carbon Trading Markets was also disputed. The topics of 
intellectual property rights and technology transfer as well as green funds for developing 
countries were also subjects of heated discussion and discontent among the parties to the 
UNFCCC. (Williams 2010) 
It is evident that the climate change convention framework fell in the trap of opposing agenda 
manipulating interests. “In the runup to Cancún, negotiators acknowledged there was no 
prospect of reaching a new treaty. They hoped instead for progress on the "building blocks" to 
a deal, such as detailed agreements on climate finance, preventing deforestation, enabling 
technology transfer and accounting for emissions cut by emerging economies such as China 
and India.” (Goldenberg 2010) 
This meant that most of the large polluters were eager to downplay the expectations prior to 
the conference. Restoring the credibility of UNFCCC was comfortably formulated as the main 
issue by the largest CO2 emitters while the most vulnerable countries struggled to put forward 
an emission reduction agenda necessary for their survival. 
 
Comparative analysis of state negotiation strategies 
 
With expectations regarding the outcome of the conference already lowered, participating 
states focused on promoting their own limited agendas. This is explained by the notion that 
for the UNFCCC parties, avoiding negative goals (losing the credibility of the Framework 
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Convention) was a higher priority than achieving positive goals (lower temperature increase 
rate). 
The failure of the previous conference in Copenhagen was largely attributed to the deadlock 
between the United States and China, and the scapego tin  game they engaged in with each 
other. For Cancún to be regarded as a success, both of these countries had to avoid the 
confrontational mood that characterized their interaction in Copenhagen. (Goldenberg 2010) 
The US negotiation team was in a difficult situation because they had to show commitment 
towards the UN framework despite the domestic legisative situation. In the summer of 2010, 
the Democrat majority in the Senate failed to pass a proposed climate bill aimed at ambitious 
emission reductions and in November the same year the Republicans won control over the 
House of Representatives.  
This meant that it was difficult for the US negotiation team both to make credible promises 
over emission reduction and to demand similar guarantees from large polluter developing 
countries like China and India. (Gardner 2010) 
The US negotiation strategy therefore focused on emphasizing the need for a new treaty after 
the Kyoto protocol expires and the growing responsibility large emitter developing countries 
should take. Highlighting this approach is the notion that Todd Stern, US Special Envoy on 
Climate Change called for a “new paradigm” in climate talks. Much of their rhetoric was 
focused on how these countries contribute more and more to global warming and how the 
proportion of emissions of industrialized countries is diminishing. (Doyle 2010) 
While trying to divert attention away from its own legislative shortcomings, the United State 
also concentrated on achieving minor successes in less vital policy areas. Establishing an 
emission cut verification system and increasing transp rency in emission cuts (particularly in 
developing countries) had long been the goal of US agenda manipulation. Analysts suggested 
that the strategy change to concentrate on “smaller items” – instead of the previous year’s 
primary focus of establishing binding emission cuts – reflects “[a] part of a mind shift that 
U.N. negotiators may be undergoing”. (Gardner 2010) 
 
In an effort of large polluting states to avoid negative goals and celebrate small achievements, 
a generally inclusive negotiation attitude was taken by many countries. Emphasis was placed 
35 
 
on creating more and more connecting issues in the multilateral negotiation framework, and 
this is how previously debated topics, such as technology transfer, intellectual property rights 
protection or long term/green found financing for por developing nations could appear on the 
agenda. 
In a controversial way, the large polluter’s endeavors to restore the credibility of the Climate 
Change Framework through focusing on achieving smaller ccomplishments benefited the 
smallest states, those that are the most exposed and the most vulnerable to the effects of 
climate change. These nations often face environmental challenges such as the rising sea 
level, desertification, draughts brought about by extreme temperature increase, floods, and 
deforestation. 
These nations have historically supported the extension of the Kyoto protocol and wished to 
promote an environmental deal that would enjoy a leg l y binding force globally. (Williams 
2010) However, they often don’t have enough bargaining capacity to be able to successfully 
promote their interests. 
They also often have to face an unfavorable bias mobilization in environmental negotiations. 
As it was shown earlier, the mobilization of bias plays an important role in controlling the 
agenda manipulation process and the subsequent decision making practice. The established 
norms and values of the UNFCCC usually prove to be difficult to change for the poor and 
vulnerable nations. 
Despite the occasional scientific skepticism, in the United Nations Climate Change 
Framework, it is usually accepted as scientific fact that in order to mitigate the effects of 
global warming, the temperature increase must not exceed 2 Celsius degrees. Scientists argue 
that up to this level, the consequences of climate change can be dealt with. Most participants 
of the UNFCCC accept this 2°C increase and it is not disputed. 
My aim is not to scientifically challenge the correctness of the measurements or to dispute the 
need to limit temperature increase to 2°C, but to point out that there seem to be an almost 
magical fascination with the maximum permissible increase being exactly 2 degrees. There 
seem to exist a bias against any suggestions that would change this number. Many developing 
countries, especially the most vulnerable ones suggest that the temperature increase should be 




The initiative of small island nations at Cancún to limit temperature rise to 1.5 Celsius 
degrees remained unsuccessful in the face of the summit’s humble goals: “AOSIS (Alliance 
of Small Island States) reiterated demands that the Cancun talks should work out a legally 
binding treaty by the end of 2011 to limit any temperature rise to below 1.5 degrees Celsius 
(2.7 Fahrenheit) above pre-industrial times. That target is far tougher than a 2C ceiling set by 
most other nations in a non-binding Copenhagen Accord agreed at a 2009 summit.” 
(Reuters.com 2010) 
 
The BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India, and China) met prior to the Cancún 
conference outside of their regular strategic cooperation schedule in order to devise a common 
strategy for the climate conference that would “oppose attempts by the West to foist legally 
binding pacts”. (Varma 2010) 
Attempts at downplaying the expectations before Cancún already began on this meeting: the 
previously quoted Jairam Ramesh, environment minister of India said at the meeting: 
"Prospects of Cancun are not bright. One thing is sure there will not be any agreement in 
Cancun. The most optimist scenario is Cancun will result in set of decisions which will set the 
stage for much of what will happen in South Africa. This is the most optimist scenario we can 
get". 
Part of devising a common strategy was to submit to voluntary, unilateral emission cuts, but 
to avoid a legally binding deal: "We announced unilateral voluntary target to reduce our 
emission intensity by 20 to 25 per cent on 2005 reference levels. We are willing to 
internationalise this but not in a legally binding manner putting on par with developed 
countries" (Varma 2010) 
The strategy of the BASIC countries also focused on h w to avoid getting stuck in a deadlock 
similar to the one on Copenhagen, where the United S ates and China both insisted on moving 
forwards with the negotiations only if the other country complied with their demands while 
simultaneously blaming the other for the stalemate. (Goswani, 2010) 
In the Cancún round, perhaps due to the absent of the threat of a legally binding deal, the 
BASIC countries were eager to voice their commitment to restraining their emissions. Such a 
roll-on roll-off strategy was common throughout the various climate change conferences. A 
periodical “apparent acceptance of a new perspective” can create a favorable image and send 
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positive signals that the negotiations are going well. Later, when attention is centered on some 
other issue, the commitment can be quietly toned down. (Judge 1997) 
The BASIC countries were in fact very much interested in restoring credibility to the United 
Nations Climate Change Framework as the multi-polar approach is certainly attractive. They 
also have vested interest in upholding and extending the Kyoto protocol, as currently they are 
the relative beneficiaries of the regime. They are not legally bound to reduce emissions while 
their potential competitors among the developed countries (with the notable exception of the 
United States) were. 
 
The future of the Kyoto protocol was indeed a focus point for much debate and sprung 
another round of scapegoating, this time between Japan and China. Japanese negotiators 
suggested that the Kyoto protocol should not be extnded, but instead a more encompassing 
deal is required. Hideki Minamikawa, deputy of Japanese environment minister argued that 
the scope of a new treaty needs to be broadened as “Kyoto countries now account for only 27 
percent of heat-trapping emissions”. (Doyle and Gardne , 2010) 
In return, developing countries said that “breaking a pledge to extend a U.N. pact for fighting 
global warming beyond 2012” would mean the failure of the Cancún round. (Ibid.) In an 
attempt to shift the blame for stalling the negotiations, Chinese special representative for 
climate change negotiations Huang Huikang said "Some countries, so far, still don't like the 
Kyoto Protocol," and that "[…] they even want to kill the Kyoto Protocol, to end the Kyoto 
Protocol". (Campbell and Wynn, 2010) 
The Japanese suggestion and the reaction from the dev loping world showed an obvious 
division between countries that wish to replace the Kyoto protocol with a new agreement 
(Japan, United States, and Canada) and the developing countries who wish to extend the 
existing agreement. (Murray 2010) 
 
After the failure of the Copenhagen summit, the European Union was eager to reaffirm its 
importance in global climate change talks. Hoping to “bridge the gap” between countries in 
favor of a new treaty and countries supporting the extension of the current regime, the EU 
offered to commit to the Kyoto protocol for a second period. The EU argued that if all states – 
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developing countries involved – made legally binding agreements, and especially if the 
United States also joined, there is no need for a new treaty and the Kyoto protocol can be 
extended. (Ibid.) 
With this negotiation move, the European Union essentially proposed criteria that were 
unacceptable to both opposing groups: “the offer effectively mirrors the negotiating position 
adopted by the EU at last year's summit in Copenhagen, which was comprehensively rejected 
by India and China on the grounds that neither country would submit to legally binding 
emission targets until industrialised countries such as the US agreed to significantly more 
ambitious targets of their own” (Ibid.) 
The dividing line remained, but the expectations towards Cancún were already defined prior 




Careful problem delimitation prior to the Cancún climate conference ensured that the 
participating countries were not hoping for a new breakthrough, but remained content with 
smaller achievements. In agenda manipulation and non-decision making it can be very 
important to celebrate even minor achievements as they can create an image of success.  The 
Cancún round ended with the pledge to create a green climate found for poor nations, but the 
specifics of where the money will come from remained uncertain.  
Still, UNFCCC Executive Secretary Christiana Figueres said: “Cancún has done its job. The 
beacon of hope has been reignited and faith in the multilateral climate change process to 
deliver results has been restored,” and: “Nations have shown they can work together under a 
common roof, to reach consensus on a common cause. They have shown that consensus in a 
transparent and inclusive process can create opportunity for all,” and also: “This is not the 
end, but it is a new beginning. It is not what is ultimately required but it is the essential 
foundation on which to build greater, collective ambition,” (UN press release, 2010) 
Emphasizing success and focusing on the future challenges to come are non-decision making 
techniques commonly employed throughout the various climate change conferences. The goal 
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at Cancún was to restore credibility to the multilater l UN framework approach, and it was 
achieved through proper problem delimitation and bias mobilization. 
The essence of the climate change problem hasn’t changed however. The main question is 
still who will bear the costs of climate change. The division over technology transfer, green 
founds carbon markets or even whether there should be a new deal or an extension of the 
Kyoto protocol boils down to the problem: who will pay. 
During the negotiations there was an obvious focus on “the money”, i.e. how/if rich countries 
will pay for the poor countries. But trading carbon quotas, forest quotas or providing straight 
monetary benefits to compensate for environmental damage, while potentially helpful for the 
developing countries, will not help with climate change, meaning they will not reduce the 
increase in temperature, or peak emissions. The focus is diverted away from solving the 
problem (reduce emissions) towards coping with it (pledge money for poor countries). And 
even that process is slow and futile so far. 
 




The 2011 Durban, South Africa round was widely perceived as the last opportunity to secure 
a new climate deal before the Kyoto protocol expires n 2012. The conference where nearly 
200 states participated started out amongst reports on how climate change was producing 
more and more devastating effects worldwide: “Two U.N. reports this month said greenhouse 
gases had reached record levels in the atmosphere and a warming world would likely bring 
more floods, stronger cyclones and more intense droughts.” (Herskovitz and Flak, 2011) 
Projections released by the OECD were also unfavorable: “[…] temperatures could rise by 3-
6 degrees Celsius by the end of the century if governm nts failed to contain emissions, 
bringing unprecedented destruction as glaciers meltand sea levels rise. It said an 80 percent 
rise in global energy demand was set to raise carbon di xide (Co2) emissions by 70 percent 
by 2050 and transport emissions were expected to double, due in part to a surge in demand for 
cars in developing nations.” (Reuters, 2011) 
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The Green Climate Found, put together in Cancún, presented some hope for the poorest 
countries, but the debt crisis in the Euro zone meant that economic rationale could potentially 
override environmental pledges.  
It was clear from the previous negotiation rounds that any agreement would depend on the 
largest polluters, the United States, China and India. Meanwhile, the dividing line between 
countries who wished to extend the Kyoto protocol, and countries who wanted to create a new 
regime still remained. Russia, Japan and Canada all declared that “they will not sign up to a 
second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol unless the biggest emitters do too”. 
(Herskovitz and Flak, 2011) 
In the face of these unfavorable circumstances, many thought that the Durban round would be 
yet another failed attempt at tackling climate change. 
 
Comparative analysis of state negotiation strategies 
 
During the Durban negotiation round, there was an interesting similarity in the negotiation 
and agenda manipulating tactics employed by the United States and the BASIC countries. 
Considering the previous rounds, especially Copenhagen, and seeing that these countries had 
some very similar interests, this was not a surprising finding. 
However, this did not mean that they would form a co lition and promote their overlapping 
interests together. On the contrary, the previously successful strategy, based on scapegoating 
and rotating praise and blame was employed by both actors. 
The most important shared goal was again to stall negotiations while at the same time, they 
were both questioning the commitment of the other to emission cuts and a possible legally 
binding treaty. A member of the US negotiation team was quoted as saying: “I don't think 
China is looking to sign up for legal obligations,” and also: "The issue for whatever point at 
which a legally binding agreement might be doable -- for us the foundation -- is that all major 
economies would need to assume obligations that had equal legal force." (Herskovitz, 2011) 
Both the United States and the BASIC countries thoug t it would be favorable to extend the 
scope of the negotiations until after 2015. Focusing o  a too small or large time frame can be 
an effective tool in agenda manipulation. The United States was “held back by domestic 
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politics at least until after a presidential election next year as Republicans and President 
Barack Obama's Democrats squabble over every attempt to ass environment legislation.” 
(Chestney and Lewis, 2011) 
The BASIC countries would also benefit from any extension of the timeline where they don’t 
have to be concerned with CO2 emission cuts. Jayanthi Natarajan, India's environment 
minister was quoted to say: "We believe strongly that we should consider the need of a further 
legal agreement (...) after assessing the actions of all under the 2015 review and look at the 
science". (Reuters, 2011) 
Learning from the experience of the previous negotiati n rounds, the European Union set it a 
high priority to avoid a deadlock between the United States and the BASIC countries. The EU 
also wished to reassess its importance in climate change negotiations after the failure of 
Copenhagen. A third goal was to restore confidence i  the European Union that was lost to 
the Euro zone crisis. (Chestney and Lewis, 2011) 
It soon became obvious that the European Union wanted to seize leadership in order to push 
through a deal that would impose legally binding emission cut targets for all countries. The 
EU argued that the situation changed since the signing of the Kyoto protocol and any deal that 
is not binding for the largest polluters would be maningless. (Herskovitz and Flak, 2011) 
The European Union realized that in order to push through a deal that could have legal force 
on the large polluters, it needed to devise a plan in which non-participation would mean 
public condemnation. With this move, the EU showed strong leadership which rallied the 
AOSIS countries to support. Together with the participation of AOSIS countries, the “road 
map” proposed by the EU would lead to “legally binding commitments by 2015”. (Chestney 




The Durban conference was regarded as major success because the European Union managed 




In this respect, the previously successful strategies of agenda manipulation by the United 
States and the BASIC countries failed to uphold the status quo. However, it is also possible, 
that accepting binding emission cuts for the future is part of a conceptual roll-on roll-off by 
the large emitters. 
It is also questionable whether this result is favor ble to the poorest and most vulnerable 
countries. Scientific evidence already seem to suggest that even a 2°C temperature increase 
can be disastrous to these countries. It is undisputed that the weakest states played a key role 




III Alternative approaches 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I wish to present a number of alternative approaches that could well 
complement the previously established theoretical framework but are not strictly related to it 
and would not fit due to the limited space available. They offer additional explanatory power 
and could provide new perspectives to enhance the understanding of how agenda 
manipulation works in international negotiations. New approaches also mean new areas for 
exciting and fruitful future research. 
First I introduce a constructivist approach which would bring a critical perspective to the 
more conventional theoretical background employed in this thesis. I believe that establishing a 
meta-theoretical perspective offers an intellectual challenge as well as highlights the different 
layers of the same problem. This approach focuses on epistemic questions: how do the 
visualization and speech acts of the epistemic community affect our mental images, and how 
public mental images affect agenda setting in politics. 
The second proposed alternative approach is vaguely connected to the first one. It is 
concerned with the effects changing public opinion have on agenda setting. It offers an 
opportunity to analyze the causes and consequences of agenda manipulation based on 
quantitative data collection. This form of alternative explanation would be concerned with 
how international negotiations are perceived by the public and how their perception changes 
based on the outcome. 
A third and final variety would be a more rigid modeling approach based on game theory. 
Understanding alignment decisions and negotiation strategies in international negotiations as 
hypergame situations provides an interesting analytic  challenge. A hypergame approach is 
perfectly suited to explain negotiations over multiple rounds while the rigorous mathematical 






The Constructivist approach 
 
Perhaps the most important difference regarding my original research topic is that this 
approach makes the research more “critical studies related” it uses and emphasizes critical 
theories instead of conventional approaches. This altern tive explanation would increase the 
number of theories used in the project while also alowing to “dig deeper” in selected areas to 
achieve a more in-depth understanding of agenda manipul tion. 
Keeping these considerations in mind and still trying to do research related to agenda 
manipulation and climate change, the new approach proposed would look into the circular 
link between scientists  popular culture  politicians  scientists. To be more specific: the 
focus of the research project is shifted to see howthe findings on climate change of the 
scientific community influences popular culture (movies, TV series, novels, etc.) which is 
then consumed by the general population. 
Since the research will focus on liberal democracies, the cycle goes on as the images created 
by popular culture influence electorate preferences, ultimately influencing politician’s 
behavior.  The feedback loop concludes with politicians influencing the scientists (and thus 



















Based on this new approach, new research questions can also become relevant. 
1) Who is part of the epistemic community and how does it xercise influence over 
agenda setting? 
2) How scientific findings presented in popular culture can change attitudes towards 
symptoms of global warming? 
3) How does the pop culture visualization of scientific findings influence environmental 
agenda manipulation? 
4) How can politicians “redraw” the above circle to directly influence popular culture? 
This alternative research project would allow the researcher to analyze a piece of popular 
culture from the field of literature, television series or movies. After a throughout 
familiarization with the body of the material, an in-depth analysis could reveal the language 
and metaphors that are used to transfer knowledge. Analyzing these speech acts would allow 
the researcher to identify the “signifier” and “signified” concepts relating to climate change. 
The goal of this approach would be to find out how the offered mental images can shape the 
social reality of the recipient (the viewer/reader), t ansform her/his attitudes and thus play a 
significant role in agenda manipulation 
 
Considering the effects of public opinion 
 
This second alternative explanation offers yet other insights into the mechanisms of agenda 
manipulation by focusing the perspective on the influence public opinion has on state 
behavior. 
It is easy to realize that when various state actors try to manipulate the agenda setting process 
in multilateral international negotiations, the items states want to put on or remove from the 
agenda can have varying significance to the people living in those countries. If a specific issue 
is regarded as important among the general population, or a subgroup with exceptionally 
strong advocacy skills, the government has to take into account the public opinion pressure 
when designing its negotiation strategy. 
Analyzing the effects of public opinion pressure is e pecially interesting in liberal 
democracies: as suggested by public choice theory, g vernment officials and bureaucrats are 
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mostly motivated by self interest and reelection. (Gordon, 2008) Agenda manipulation and 
non-decision making allows politicians a way to circumvent and manage pressure from public 
opinion by carefully selecting the agenda topics, post oning action or reframing the problems. 
Therefore, by studying worldwide public opinion polls on climate change and evaluating the 
level of interest citizens of various countries have in climate change, it is possible to see what 
interests each state has during the course of negotiations to manipulate the climate talk agenda 
one way or another. 
If for example in a given country that the electorae is very much concerned about the effects 
of climate change, but the government is reluctant o act as a consequence of some other 
advocacy pressure, it can be argued that during the negotiations that government will likely be 
short on actions but not on words. That is, the government will surly support measures to be 
taken against climate change in its rhetoric, but will use subtle techniques to make sure that 
actions don’t have to follow those commitments. 
The shift in the level of interest in a given topic is both a driving force of state non-decisions 
(as it was argued before) and a consequence of it. Assessing the general awareness and 
interest in climate change in the following countries with the help of public opinion studies 
will give some insight into what do citizens from the analyzed countries think of climate 
change and how their perspective was altered during time. 
Climate change for example gained increased international public attention with the adoption 
of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, but the following years saw different responses to this shift in 
public awareness from different governments (Lorenzoni and Pidgeon, 2006). 
During the past fifteen years the European Union has been trying to take a leading role on the 
issue of climate change as evidenced by the European Commission’s initiative setting, middle 
and long term policy strategy2. In the United States, after the fossil fuel friendly Bush 
administration, Barack Obama started his presidential term by advocating the need to promote 
the increasing use of renewable energy sources in his inaugural address.  (Randerson, 2009) 
Meanwhile, the other big polluter, China is working hard to establish a multilateral world 
order in which it sees itself as an advocate of the int rest of developing countries regarding 
climate change. 




Most of the developing countries are in fact the ons who are most affected by the adverse 
effects of climate change. At the same time, as evidenced by the presentation of Anthony 
Leiserowitz at the Copenhagen Climate Conference, usually there is very little awareness of 
the issue in these states. (Leiserowitz, 2009) The previously mentioned Gallup Poll3-based 
presentation also points out a very strongly distingu shed North-South division on climate 
change awareness. 
The implications of the different levels of environmental consciousness are twofold. First, in 
the global South, public pressure on governments may not be as strong because of the lack of 
awareness. In the global North however, where the electorate is more informed about climate 
change (as signaled by a clear majority of responses reporting awareness of climate change as 
well as identifying climate change as a human-caused phenomenon), they can exert greater 
pressure on their countries’ leadership. 
Therefore it would be interesting to conduct quantit tive analysis on both developing and 
developed countries over a period of time, to see how and if different outcomes of different 
climate change summits shaped public opinion in one way or another. 
 
Hypergame based alignment theories 
 
In a future research project it could be interesting and rewarding look into how game 
theoretical methods can be used to model the alignment between state actors in the agenda 
manipulation process. Constructing an analytical model based on mathematical approach 
makes both the presentation of ideas and their falsfic tion clear and easy to understand. 
Utilizing well constructed game theoretical models have the added benefit of offering some 
clues as to what is likely to happen in a given situat on in the future which can give decision 
makers the means to fight the obstruction of the agenda setting process in the future. 
These models don’t simply provide a descriptive formulation, but also help to create a better 
understanding of how agenda manipulation works in international negotiations. Non-decision 
                                                
3 Gallup World Poll methodology: Annual surveys in over 150 countries, covering around 95% of World 
population. Nationally representative, typically n=1000. The poll contains a wide range of questions, regarding 
food and shelter, well-being, politics, values, environment, etc, translated into major local languages. Four 
questions on climate change from 2007-2009: awareness and self reported knowledge, causes (human or natural), 
risk perception (personal threat), national governme t action. 
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making in such situations where states simultaneously decide on some form of alignemnt can 
be seen as a hypergame problem in which actors with limited information sequentially react to 
the choices of each other. 
Studying what methods of game theory can be used to model international negotiations could 
yield interesting findings and new insights. “Prisoner’s dilemma” could be one possibility 
since it deals with the lack of trust between the actors, while the idea of “tragedy of 
commons” can be used to understand environmental security as a “global public good” with 







The main goal of the master thesis was to investigate the mechanisms of agenda manipulation 
in international negotiations through a series of case studies. It was established that proper 
problem delimitation, careful selection of negotiation strategies, the existing mobilization of 
bias, and non-decision making methods can all contribute to successful agenda manipulation. 
It was established that the ability to affect the ag nda setting process does not depend only on 
a state’s relative power. There exist certain outside conditions that are impossible to change 
during the negotiations and they might favor one side over another. The existence of various 
biases and the path dependency created by past negoiations can mean that even stronger 
states fail at agenda manipulation. 
Moreover, as it was presented in the third case study, alignment choices and alliances can 
have a great impact on who defines the agenda. This means that relatively weak states can 
also have important bargaining power and can swing ne otiation outcomes one way or 
another. 
Analyzing the behavior of the BASIC countries and the United States showed that agenda 
manipulation is not only aimed at advancing a state’s own interests, but negotiators are also 
concerned with other states’ gains, and thus relativ  gains can become more important than 
absolute gains. 
Perhaps the most important implication of the thesis and in particular the case study section is 
that it is very difficult to avoid abusive agenda mnipulation and non-decision making. It was 
shown however, that when states can exercise credible pressure over each other, negotiations 
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